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1Exploiting rateless codes and belief propagation
to infer identity of polluters in MANET
Rossano Gaeta, Marco Grangetto, Riccardo Loti
Abstract—
In this paper, we consider a scenario where nodes in a MANET disseminate data chunks using rateless codes. Any node is able to
successfully decode any chunk by collecting enough coded blocks from several other nodes without any coordination. We consider
the problem of identifying malicious nodes that launch a pollution attack by deliberately modifying the payload of coded blocks before
transmitting. It follows that the original chunk can only be obtained if there are no malicious nodes among the chunk providers.
In this paper we propose SIEVE, a fully distributed technique to infer the identity of malicious nodes. A node creates what we termed a
check whenever a chunk is decoded; a check is a pair composed of the set of other nodes that provided coded blocks used to decode
the chunk (the chunk uploaders) and a flag indicating whether the chunk is corrupted or not. SIEVE exploits rateless codes to detect
chunk integrity and belief propagation to infer the identity of malicious nodes. In particular, every node autonomously constructs its own
bipartite graph (a.k.a. factor graph in the literature) whose vertexes are checks and nodes, respectively. Then, it periodically runs the
belief propagation algorithm on its factor graph to infer the probability of other nodes being malicious.
We show by running detailed simulations using ns-3 that SIEVE is very accurate and robust under several attack scenarios and
deceiving actions. We discuss how the topological properties of the factor graph impacts SIEVE performance and show that nodes
speed in the MANET plays a role on the identification accuracy. Furthermore, an interesting trade-off between coding efficiency and
SIEVE accuracy, completeness, and reactivity is discovered. We also show that SIEVE is efficient requiring low computational, memory,
and communication resources.
Keywords—MANET, rateless codes, belief propagation, pollution attack, malicious node identification, statistical inference.
✦
1 INTRODUCTION
Mobile Ad-hoc Networks (MANET) are characterized by
open, distributed and dynamic architectures, built on top
of the shared wireless medium; all features contribute to
make MANET very vulnerable to attacks at any layer of
the Internet model [1], [2].
We consider a particular type of active, non-
cryptography related attack, where insider nodes cor-
rupt data at the application level (this is also known
as pollution attack). In this paper we deem as a use
case a data dissemination application over a MANET.
Nodes generate data chunks to be disseminated to all
participants using rateless codes; some malicious nodes
deliberately modify coded packets of a chunk before
relaying them to prevent honest nodes from obtaining
the original information.
In this paper we propose SIEVE a decentralized, ac-
curate and robust technique to identify malicious nodes
on top of an otherwise reliable and attacker-free ar-
chitecture. Each node in SIEVE dynamically creates a
bipartite graph (factor graph) whose vertexes are checks
and uploading nodes. A check is a report created by
a node upon decoding a data chunk; a check contains
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a variable length list of nodes identifiers that provided
parts of the data as well as a flag to signal if the
data chunk has been corrupted. Detection of the com-
promised chunks is achieved exploiting the constraints
imposed by linear channel coding. The factor graph is
periodically and independently analyzed by each node
running an incremental version of the Belief Propagation
(BP) algorithm [3], [4], [5], [6]. The proposed algorithm
allows each node to compute the probability of any other
node being malicious; these latter probabilities are used
to derive a suspect ranking of nodes in the MANET. Each
node updates its local factor graph using the checks
obtained by its own decoding operations as well as
checks that are periodically gossiped by neighbor nodes.
Our contributions
The major contributions of the paper are the recasting of
the problem of malicious nodes identification in terms of
the estimation of the marginal probabilities on a bipartite
graph and the proposal of a decentralized and accurate
solution based on the BP algorithm. It is worth pointing
out that the selected data dissemination application is
just a quite popular use case [7], [8], whereas the pro-
posed approach is by no means constrained to a single
scenario. In particular, SIEVE can be used in any appli-
cation that uses multi-party download or collaboration,
provided that is possible to detect that a given set of
collaborating entities is compromised by at least one
malicious node. As opposed to cryptographic/algebraic
2techniques proposed in the area of network coding based
wireless mesh networks, e.g., [9], [10], [11], [12] SIEVE
does not rely on verification tools to check the integrity
of every coded block. In SIEVE the BP algorithm is used
to infer the identity of the malicious nodes resting upon
only on a simple pollution detection mechanism; as an
example, in our reference scenario, pollution detection
is achieved as a by product of the data dissemination
protocol based on rateless codes. Furthermore, the afore-
mentioned solutions may not be suitable for MANET
since mobility is likely to affect key predistribution,
routing mechanisms, attack behavior, etc.
SIEVE fits well two key MANETs features that must
be accounted for when devising any security solution: it
is fully decentralized and does not rely on any infras-
tructure (as opposed to some solutions in the area of
peer-to-peer streaming where special well known nodes
are necessary, e.g., [13]). Furthermore, SIEVE requires
small computational, storage, and communication costs
for implementation.
Paper contributions are completed by a comprehen-
sive experimental investigation of SIEVE capabilities.
Our analysis is carried out by detailed simulations us-
ing ns-3; we show that SIEVE is accurate in letting
each honest node identify all malicious nodes under
several scenarios. We analyze the sensitivity of SIEVE
performance to the nodes speed and we stress test
SIEVE under several deceiving actions, colluding attacks
launched by malicious nodes, and increasing number of
malicious nodes. We also discuss an interesting trade-off
between rateless code efficiency and SIEVE performance.
The SIEVE technique has been partially presented in [14].
The current paper includes a richer set of experimental
results and a more detailed analysis of the obtained
performance indexes, worked out on a larger set of
system settings.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes
the system model we consider, Section 3 presents the
SIEVE technique, Section 4 discusses the simulation
methodology and the accuracy, reactivity, and robustness
results we obtained, Section 5 summarizes other works
related to SIEVE, finally Section 6 draws conclusions and
outlines directions for future developments.
2 A USE CASE FOR SIEVE
In this paper we consider a MANET composed of N
wireless nodes moving in a given area. A set of Nsource
nodes periodically produces a new data chunk to be
disseminated to all others once every h seconds. All
nodes cooperate to the diffusion of the data chunks by
running a distributed dissemination algorithm based on
Luby Transform (LT) codes [15]. Data is transmitted by
source nodes using LT codes [15]: a chunk (whose size
in bytes is fixed and is denoted as S) is divided in K
equally sized blocks. The source node then creates and
forwards coded packets using LT codes [15], combining
random subsets of the K blocks; the size of each coded
packet is Scb = SK .
2.1 LT codes
LT codes have been proposed in [15] and represents one
of the first embodiment of the class of rateless codes:
these are a particular family of erasure codes where the
rate is not fixed by design, so that the number of coded
packets can be decided and changed on the fly. LT codes
are rateless based on the binary Galois field GF(2), i.e.,
coded packets are computed with simple binary XOR of
random subsets of the K original data blocks. In [15]
it is shown that selecting the number of blocks to be
combined, termed as the packet degree d, according to
the Robust Soliton Distribution (RSD)1, one gets optimal
asymptotic decoding performance. By optimal perfor-
mance we mean that the so called decoding overhead,
i.e. the number of coded packets to be received in excess
of K, turns to be negligible for asymptotically large
K. In particular, the original chunk can be obtained by
any node able to collect any set of M = K · (1 + ϵ)
coded packets (on average), where ϵ is defined as the
code overhead. The decoding algorithm can be viewed
as the solution of a system of linear equations with K
unknowns (the K original data blocks) and M ≥ K
equations. In [15] it is shown that a simple method based
on the recursive cancellation of equations corresponding
to packets with degree 1, i.e. representing one original
data blocks, guarantees the desired asymptotic perfor-
mance.
2.2 LT based dissemination protocol
The rateless principle and randomness of LT codes is
used for spreading data in the MANET by letting source
nodes transmit novel coded packets that can be gen-
erated randomly and on the fly. A coded packet con-
veys the XORed payloads of the corresponding original
packets as well as a header signaling the indexes of the
combined packets. The original chunk can be obtained
by any node able to collect any set of K · (1 + ϵ) coded
packets without requiring any coordination among the
source nodes. In turn, whenever a node is able to suc-
cessfully decode a chunk, it can behave as a new source
for the chunk, generating and disseminating novel coded
blocks.
In Fig. 1 the algorithmic steps of the LT based dissem-
ination protocol implemented by a node are graphically
sketched. Each node can simultaneously collect coded
packets for different chunks; to this end a window based
mechanism is used where the wr most recent chunks can
be concurrently downloaded and progressively decoded.
As soon as a given chunk is decoded (this event happens
on average when K · (1 + ϵ) coded blocks of the chunk
have been buffered), the corresponding data blocks are
moved into a buffer storing the wt data chunks that
have been decoded most recently. A simple round robin
scheduling policy is used on the transmitter side, where
1. RSD is derived by the Ideal Soliton Distribution and depends on
two free parameters usually identified with constants c and δ .
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Fig. 1: Node operations: LT encoding, decoding and
dissemination protocol.
one of the data chunk is selected, a novel LT coded
packet is encoded and transmitted. A new coded packet
is transmitted every Ttx ms using UDP over an 802.11g
wireless communication interface yielding an average
transmission range of r meters.
2.3 Malicious nodes
The proposed dissemination protocol is an example of
a distributed and collaborative approach that has the
potential to simplify and accelerate the spreading of the
information in the MANET thanks to node mobility. On
the other hand, few malicious nodes may try to break the
system by polluting, i.e. modifying some coded packets.
In this paper we assume that a subset of P < N nodes is
composed of malicious nodes, that deliberately modify the
payload of the coded packets to prevent honest nodes
from correctly reconstructing the original chunk. In the
presence of coding even a single corrupted coded packet
can prevent an honest node from decoding the original
chunk.
3 THE SIEVE PROTOCOL
SIEVE uses LT codes decoding mechanism to detect
modified chunks and exploits the Belief Propagation (BP)
algorithm [3] to identify malicious nodes.
3.1 LT codes verification mechanism
According to the dissemination strategy described in
Sect. 2 every node keeps collecting from different up-
loaders sets of coded blocks corresponding to different
chunks. LT codes can be exploited to detect if modified
blocks have been collected without the need of any
supplementary verification mechanism.
Indeed, a node is able to detect pollution as soon as an
inconsistency is found in the solution of the underlying
system of linear equations. In particular, according to
the procedure [15] the decoder keeps canceling out all
the already known data packets. This is achieved by
observing that a coded packet with a degree 1 equation
represents a data packet in the clear. Such data packet
can be simplified from all the incoming equations. Since
LT codes have a certain overhead some coded packets
that are linearly dependent on the ones received previ-
ously are always collected before successful decoding;
this amount to the reception of some equations whose
terms are all already known. As soon as this condition
is met the LT decoder can check the consistency of the
payload carried by the coded packet; in other words, the
same linear combination must be obtained combining
a set of already known packets. If this constraint is
violated the whole chunk is recognized as corrupted.
Please note that the receiver node is not able to identify
the corrupted block(s) but only that at least one of them
has been maliciously manipulated.
3.2 Check construction and reporting
SIEVE is based on the concept of checks that are reports
created by nodes upon decoding a chunk. A check
contains the list of the identifiers of nodes that provided
coded blocks of a chunk and a flag to label such chunk as
corrupted or not. A check describing a corrupted chunk
is called a positive check while it is termed a negative check
otherwise. Each nodes n maintains a list of all checks
created that is denoted as Ln.
Each node, besides accumulating the checks from its
local decoding operations, gossips them in the neighbor-
hood. Each node n in the MANET transmits its checks
in two cases:
• as soon as n decodes a chunk it inserts it in Ln and
broadcasts it;
• once every Ts seconds n randomly selects Q checks
in Ln and transmits them.
3.3 Identification based on belief propagation
The checks in Ln and all checks received by n are used
to build a factor graph Gn=(U , C, E). Gn is a bipartite graph
where the vertex set U is the set of uploader nodes, the
vertex set C is the set of checks, and an undirected edge
{i, I} ∈ E exists if and only if check I ∈ C depends on
uploader i ∈ U .
In the following we will refer to the set of uploaders
involved in check I as UI and the set of checks that
node i contributes as an uploader as Ci. An example
of factor graph with four uploaders (circles) and two
checks (squares) is show in Fig. 2. The factor graph
can be progressively created while decoding the chunks.
In Fig. 2 we assume that a node has decoded two
chunks corresponding to two checks in its local factor
graph. The filled square represents a positive check due
to the detection of a modified chunk concurrently down-
loaded by three nodes (in the figure we assume that the
rightmost node is malicious). The remaining check is a
negative one, appended when a chunk has been decoded
successfully. From the point of view of any decoding
node, each uploader i can be in one of two hidden states
xi = 1 or xi = 0, depending on whether uploader i is
or is not a malicious node. Each check can report one of
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Fig. 2: Example of factor graph.
two observations cI = 0 or cI = 1 in case of negative or
positive pollution detection, respectively.
The problem of identifying the malicious nodes from
a given number of checks can be recast as an inference
problem. The goal of the inference is the estimation of
the hidden state of the nodes, i.e. being malicious or not,
given a set of observations corresponding to the checks.
Each check can be interpreted as an accusation raised
against a set of uploader nodes by a witness node. In
this paper we adopt the BP algorithm [3], [4], [5], [6], that
has been used to solve a number of inference problems
in many different fields, e.g., iterative channel decoding
[16], Bayesian networks [3] and computer vision [17] to
mention a few.
The BP algorithm can be used to estimate from the
factor graph the so called variable marginals (P (xi))i∈U ,
i.e. the probability of node i being malicious. BP is an
iterative algorithm based on the exchange of probability
estimates (also called messages or beliefs), along the
edges of the bipartite graph Gn. In case of a Bayesian
network BP represents a closed-form solution for the
marginals. Nonetheless, the same algorithm has proven
to be a robust estimator for the variable marginals of
general factor graph [5], [6].
In our setting it is convenient to distinguish between
two classes of messages: message from uploader i to
check I , mxiI , that is meant to be the probability that
uploader i is in state x, given the information collected
via checks other than check I (Ci \ I); message from
check I to uploader i, mxIi is defined as the probability
of check I having value cI if uploader i is considered in
state x and all the other uploader states have a separable
distribution given by the probabilities {mxi′I : i′ ∈ UI \ i}.
The BP algorithm is based on iterative refinements
of the check messages mxIi based on the current values
of the node messages mxiI (check pass), followed by
updating of mxiI as a function of mxIi (node pass). For
the first check pass the messages are initialized to the
values m0iI = m1iI = 0.5, since we assume that no prior
information on the number and identity of the malicious
nodes is available.
The check pass is based on the estimation of the
probabilities mxIi as follows:
mxIi =
∑
{xi′ :i′∈UI\i}
P (cI |xi = x, {x′i : i′ ∈ UI \ i})
∏
i′∈UI\i
m
x′i
i′I
(1)
Equation (1) depends on the probability of observing a
certain check value cI , given the states of the uploaders
of such check.
Given that a check turns out to be positive as soon as
at least one of the uploaders is a malicious node, we can
write:
P (cI = 1|{xi : i = 1, . . . , k}) =
{
0, if xi = 0, ∀i
1, otherwise (2)
Analogously, observing that a check can be negative if
and only if all the uploaders are not malicious, we get
P (cI = 0|{xi : i = 1, . . . , k}) =
{
1, if xi = 0, ∀i
0, otherwise (3)
Plugging the last two expressions into Equation (1) we
can simplify the check pass computation as follows:
mxIi =
⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩
∏
i′∈UI\im
0
i′I if cI = 0, x = 0
0 if cI = 0, x = 1
1−∏i′∈UI\im0i′I if cI = 1, x = 0
1 otherwise
(4)
The next BP step is constituted by the updating of
the probabilities mxiI , using information from previous
computation in the checks (node pass), according to (5):
mxiI =
∏
I′∈Ci\I
mxI′i (5)
After any node pass it is possible to get an estimate
of the marginal P (xi = x) according to:
P (xi = x) =
∏
I′∈Ci
mxI′i (6)
We recall that the probability estimates given by Equa-
tion (5) and (6) are not guaranteed to be normalized; in
the practical implementation we use proper normaliza-
tion constants to avoid numerical issues as suggested in
[4].
To conclude, the BP algorithm initializes the values
of mxiI , then keeps iterating using Equations (4) and (5).
A reliable estimate of P (xi = x) is computed after a
certain number of such iterations using (6). In all the
experiments reported in this paper 3 iterations have been
used to strike a balance between estimation accuracy and
complexity.
3.4 BP complexity
The computational cost of single message update using
Equation (4) amounts to |UI | − 1 multiplications, where
operator | · | evaluates the cardinality of a set. Since
messages are associated to each edge of the bipartite
graph we can conclude that the overall check pass takes
on average |E|(zU − 1) multiplications, zU being the
average number of uploaders per check.
Using the same reasoning from (5) one can compute
the cost of the node pass as |E|(zC − 1) multiplications,
where zC is the average number of checks per node.
5Analogously, the final estimate in (6) takes |E|zC mul-
tiplications.
Finally, taking into accounts all the BP steps and
assuming 3 iterations the overall computational com-
plexity amounts to 3(|E|(zU − 1) + |E|(zC − 1)) + |E|zC
multiplications.
3.5 Incremental BP estimation
In the previous description of the BP we have assumed
that the factor graph Gn is known in advance and kept
fixed for all the iterations. In practice this assumption
is not met in the proposed scenario. Nonetheless, the
proposed algorithm can be implemented using an incre-
mental (or sliding window) approach as follows.
Each node n keeps receiving checks from the other
ones and it is allowed to run the BP on Gn every
T seconds considering only the checks received and
created in a time window of the past w seconds. At
time t, depending on the checks stored during a time
window w, an updated factor graph Gn,t,w is obtained by
removing the old checks and adding the new ones; then,
the corresponding estimates Pt,w(xi = x) are computed
through BP. The belief values mxiI are initialized to 0.5
when the i-th node is met for the first time; then, the
partial estimates of mxiI are stored in memory and prop-
agated to all the iterations and computation windows
where such values are needed.
After every BP estimation of P (xi = x), a list of
suspect nodes is obtained by setting a threshold on the
probability Pt,w(xi = 1) ≥ η. Each node n keeps a
counter for each of its uploader nodes i: the nodes in
the list of suspects after the BP run have their counter in-
creased by 1. Finally, a suspects ranking Rn over uploader
nodes is defined by sorting their counters in decreasing
order. As an example, the first node in the suspects
ranking at time t is the uploader that more often has
been included in the list of suspects after all the BP runs
performed up to time t.
4 RESULTS
In this section we describe the simulation methodology
and the indexes we defined to evaluate the accuracy,
reactivity, and robustness of SIEVE. In particular, we
show how the structural properties of the factor graph
Gn and mobility impact the performance of SIEVE as
well as how robust it is with respect to several deceiving
actions operated by malicious nodes. Finally, we show a
trade-off between coding efficiency and SIEVE accuracy.
4.1 Factor graph and performance
According to [18] when short cycles are absent in the
factor graph Gn it is best to have high degree nodes
(i.e., uploaders that contribute to many checks) and low
degree checks (i.e., checks obtained from a small num-
ber of uploaders). High degree nodes (both malicious
and honest) tend to their correct marginal probability
(P (xi))i∈U (i.e. the probability of node i being malicious)
quickly; on the other hand, the lower the number of
uploaders in a check the more valuable the information
it conveys.
Unfortunately, the actual factor graphs computed by
nodes do contain cycles and it is well known that cycles
in the factor graph negatively impact on the accuracy
of the probability estimates yielded by the BP algorithm
[18]. The shortest length of a cycle in a bipartite graph
with at most one edge between any two nodes is 4 and
is due to the presence of at least two common uploaders
in a pair of checks, i.e. the cardinality of the intersection
between the uploaders of a pair of checks is at least 2.
If the cardinality of the intersection is x > 2, then each
of the
(x
2
)
pairs defines one length 4 cycle. Equivalently,
a cycle forms if any two nodes contributed to provide
blocks of at least two common checks. It is easy to note
that the higher the degree of nodes and/or checks the
higher the number of cycles in the factor graph.
In this context, the benefits of high degree nodes and
low degree checks are counter-balanced by the negative
effects of cycles. Indeed, increasing the average number
of checks per node improves the performance of the BP
algorithm up to a point where the number of cycles
increases too much and lowers the accuracy of the BP
algorithm. Similarly, the benefits of a lower average
check degree are offset by a high number of cycles.
4.2 Simulation methodology
The performance of SIEVE have been investigated by
simulations using ns-3 version 3.12 [19] on a Red Hat
4.4.6-3 machine using standard variable settings. In
particular, we developed a node object implementing
the sender and receiver functionalities according to the
protocol described in Sections 2 and 3. The MANET
is composed of N wireless nodes placed in a square
area whose side length is l meters. Nodes move using
different average speeds. Nfast nodes moving at Vfast
m/s (e.g., cars, buses, motorcycles), Nslow nodes at Vslow
m/s (e.g., pedestrian, bikes), and Nstill fixed nodes (e.g.,
sensors, relay stations, shops). As a consequence we
have N = Nfast + Nslow + Nstill. All non-fixed nodes
movements are described by the same mobility model
and moving nodes are randomly distributed across the
simulation area at the beginning of the experiment. Still
nodes are distributed on a grid to avoid clustering in a
particular region. We used the ns-3 default transmission
model composed of a propagation delay model (a con-
stant value model) and a propagation loss model (based
on a log distance model with a reference loss of 46.677
dB at a distance of 1 meter). Under these settings we
derived the maximal transmission range r as 175 meters.
We conducted simulation experiments that terminate
after 1 hour of simulated time. We used the independent
replication method to obtain NEXP = 30 executions and
computed 95% confidence intervals. Each execution is
obtained with different streams of the random number
6Parameter Description Value
Nfast, Nslow Number of fast/slow nodes 100
Nstill Number of still nodes 50
Pfast, Pslow Number of fast/slow polluters 5
Pstill Number of still polluters 0
K Number of blocks 100
Scb Size of blocks 500 Bytes
Ttx Time between transmissions of
blocks
100 ms
c, δ RSD parameters for LT encoder 0.01
l Square area side length 2000 m
h Time between data chunk gen-
eration
600 s
wr Window size for concurrent
chunk downloading
50
wt Window size for concurrent
chunk uploading
6
r Maximal transmission range 175 m
Vfast Fast nodes speed [10-40] m/s
Vslow Slow nodes speed [1-5] m/s
- Mobility model 2D RW
TABLE 1: Parameter values for the reference scenario.
generator provided by ns-3. The simulation output is
made of a log file containing all checks received by each
node that is post-processed by our analysis software to
run the SIEVE protocol to detect malicious nodes.
All results have been obtained by setting as initial
data sources only the Nstill still nodes; all N nodes
contribute to the spreading of the information according
to the policy described in Section 2. A subset of nodes
(P = Pfast + Pslow + Pstill < N ) are simulated as
malicious nodes that modify the coded packets. All
the system parameter values of the reference scenario
considered in the following are summarized in Table 1.
4.3 Performance indexes
For each node n in the system we define:
• p(n) an indicator function whose value is equal to
1 if node n is not malicious and 0 otherwise;
• cn(t) an indicator function whose value is equal to
1 if Rn is non empty at time t and 0 otherwise;
• an(t) the number of actual malicious nodes correctly
identified by node n at time t. More precisely,
an(t) = x if x nodes in the top P positions of Rn
are truly malicious;
• rn(t) the number of actual malicious nodes correctly
identified in the top positions of Rn at time t. More
precisely, rn(t) = x if top x nodes in Rn are all
actually malicious. If SIEVE at time t has identified
P − 1 out of P malicious nodes (an(t) = P − 1) but
the first node in Rn is not malicious then rn(t) = 0.
• tn,trigger the time node n received the very first
positive check that triggered the SIEVE activation;
• tn,hit(x) = mint{t : rn(t) ≥ x}, that is, the minimum
time to identify at least x malicious nodes in the top
x positions of Rn.
In each independent replication trial we compute the
following averages:
• c(i)(t) =
∑N
n=1 p(n)cn(t)∑N
n=1 p(n)
, i.e., the fraction of honest
nodes that detected the attack and have a non empty
R;
• a(i)(t) = 1P
∑N
n=1 p(n)cn(t)an(t)∑N
n=1 p(n)cn(t)
, i.e., the average ac-
curacy of honest nodes with non empty R. When
a(i)(t) = 1 it means that all honest nodes with
non empty R have correctly identified all malicious
nodes.
• tsi(i)(x) =
∑N
n=1 p(n)(tn,hit(x)−tn,trigger)∑N
n=1 p(n)
, i.e., the av-
erage time honest nodes require to unambiguously
identify x malicious nodes.
Finally, we computed averages and 95% confidence in-
tervals over NEXP executions and considered c(t), a(t),
and tsi(x) that we call completeness, accuracy, and time
to identification, respectively. In all computations we
set η = 0.99 (η is the threshold on the probability
Pt,w(xi = 1) for suspect identification) and iterated each
run of the BP algorithm on a specific factor graph three
times.
4.4 Sensitivity results
The first analysis we conducted is on the sensitivity
of c(t), a(t), and tsi(x) to parameters w, T , Ts, and Q
used by SIEVE as defined in Section 3. To this end we
considered integer multiples of 10s values for w ranging
from 10s to 90s, T = {5, 10}s, Ts = {5, 10, 15}s, and
Q = {5, 10}. We analyzed all 108 combinations and
observed that SIEVE performance is most sensitive to
the value w.
Figure 3 shows the performance indexes a(t), c(t),
and tsi(x) for some values of w, when T = Ts = 10
s and Q = 10 (all 108 configurations yielded similar
results so we selected a representative set of curves).
It can be noted that too small or too large values for
w yield the worst performance for all the performance
indexes. Indeed, small window sizes do not allow the
factor graph to include enough checks and nodes to
accurately infer the node status; on the other hand,
large values of w provide more checks and nodes in Gn
but increase the number of cycles in the factor graph
which in turn impact on the accuracy of the probability
estimates yielded by the BP algorithm, as discussed in
Section 4.1.
We summarized the structural properties of Gn in
Table 2. It can be noted that the average number of nodes
per check zU is not dependent on w (it mostly depends
on the overall number of nodes, the mobility patterns,
and the data exchange protocols). On the contrary, the
size of Gn (|C| and |U|) increases as w increases although
the number of nodes saturates since it is upper bounded
by N . Accordingly, the average number of checks per
node zC increases and it positively impacts on SIEVE
accuracy up to the value w = 60; for larger values the
average number of cycles in the factor graph increases
and nullifies the increase of zC .
It can also be noted that c(t) approaches 1 after
about 4 minutes; the behavior of c(t) clearly depends on
the delay after which a node has collected a sufficient
amount of checks to start its own suspect ranking. As
for SIEVE reactivity, we observe that w = 60s yields
7w |C| zU |U| zC length 4 cycles
10 83.1688 8.53656 173.7 3.8633 1175.57
30 247.617 8.55307 216.824 9.29914 8899.69
60 492.807 8.5262 231.687 17.3395 32021.6
90 735.944 8.49615 236.444 25.3386 68064.4
TABLE 2: Structural properties of Gn for increasing val-
ues of w.
the lowest values for the time to identification tsi(x)
(all graphs for tsi(x) are computed for the maximum
x such that for each honest node n it is true at the end
of the simulation experiment that rn = x). Based on the
above discussion on the impact of w on the performance
of SIEVE, we selected w = 60s as the value for all the
following experiments.
Figure 4 shows a comparison among different choices
of the values for parameters T , Ts, and Q (please recall
that each node executes a BP estimation once every T
seconds and transmits a selection of Q checks once every
Ts seconds). In particular, we selected three settings for
three different values of the number of checks transmit-
ted per seconds ( QTs = 2, 1, 0.33). It can be noted that
performance of SIEVE achieve their best when the BP
estimation is run more frequently (T = 5s) and the the
number of checks transmitted per seconds is the highest.
Nevertheless, improved performance come at the cost
of increased computation and communication burden
on nodes; this may cause concerns for battery operated
nodes whose lifetime could be shortened. Based on the
above reasoning, we selected a compromise between
performance and energy consumption awareness using
the following setting for the rest of the paper: w = 60s,
T = Ts = 10s, Q = 10.
4.5 Mobility and SIEVE performance
The first interesting observations we made is that mobil-
ity affects SIEVE performance. In particular, the perfor-
mance depends not only on the speed but also on the
mobility model adopted for nodes.
Figure 5 shows the performance of SIEVE in the ref-
erence scenario with different mobility models available
in ns-3, i.e. 2D random walk, random direction, Gauss-
Markov and steady state random waypoint; clearly, all
mobility models have been compared for the same node
speeds. It can be noted that the 2D random walk mobility
model selected for the reference scenario yields slightly
worse performance with respect to other mobility mod-
els that more closely represent mobility in a urban
environment.
Figure 6 shows the performance of SIEVE in the
reference scenario but averaged over nodes in the same
speed class (fast, slow, still). It can be noted that accuracy
of fast nodes is higher with respect to slow and still
nodes. Reaction times are also lower for fast moving
nodes.
Figure 7 shows the overall performance of SIEVE in
the reference scenario and in scenarios with different
mixes of fast and slow nodes. The system where all
moving nodes are fast yields much higher accuracy
and much lower reaction times with respect to other
extreme case where all nodes move slowly. Nevertheless,
SIEVE accuracy is 0.83 at the end of the one hour long
experiments and approaches 1 for longer runs.
Figure 8 shows results in the reference scenario and
in scenarios where all malicious nodes are either fast or
slow. This results show that malicious nodes can delay
their identification if they move slowly; on the other
hand if all malicious nodes move fast all of them are
quickly identified.
Although SIEVE is able to identify all malicious nodes
in the long run in any setting, in all three cases we can
conclude that high speed is key to obtain both high accuracy
and low reaction delays by honest nodes.
Why is higher speed beneficial for SIEVE performance
of honest nodes but detrimental for malicious nodes?
Consider the case where different mixes of fast and
slow nodes (Figure 7) are compared and assume an
extreme scenario composed of all still nodes. Since nodes
do not move it is possible to define a static geometric
graph O describing connections among nodes where
vertexes are nodes and an undirected edge between two
vertexes exists if the corresponding nodes are within the
transmission radio range r. For any node n ∈ O let N (n)
denote the set of nodes connected to n (the neighborhood
of n).
Consider one data source s and a chunk c; clearly,
when s has transmitted K · (1 + ϵ) coded packets, c
is decoded by all nodes in N (s); in turn, these nodes
start transmitting fresh coded packets for c and, if O is
connected, all nodes will be able to decode c after some
time. It can be noted that all coded packets produced
by s will follow the same paths in O. This means that
for any node n ∈ O chunks originating from s will be
provided to n by the same set of uploaders Us(n) that is a
subset of N (n). Of course, the same reasoning is valid
for all checks describing chunks produced by any data
source other than s. The final effect is that the set of
checks created by each node n upon decoding chunks
(Ln) is such that strong intersections exist among the
uploaders of different checks (given that O is static and
N (n) does not change over time); this translates into a
high number of short cycles in the factor graph used by
SIEVE that is a well known cause of poor performance
of the BP algorithm, as discussed in Section 4.1.
Instead, when nodes move the geometric graph O
becomes dynamic, i.e., for any node n its N (n) varies
with time. Speed translates into higher rate of changes
in N (n) that, in turn, reduces the number intersections
among the uploaders of different checks (hence of short
cycles in Gn) and increases the accuracy of BP algorithm.
For the reference scenario we computed the structural
properties of Gn that are summarized in Table 3. It can be
noted that the average number of nodes per check (zU )
and the average number of checks per node (zC) for still
nodes would suggest better performance with respect to
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models.
speed |C| zU |U| zC length 4 cycles
fast 434.14 8.6891 232.594 15.8041 23240.5
slow 428.937 8.91507 230.292 15.8437 29242.7
still 737.88 7.42264 232.663 23.4016 55141.4
TABLE 3: Structural properties of Gn for different nodes
speed in the reference scenario.
fast and slow nodes. Nevertheless, the average number
of length four cycles is much higher for still nodes and
this is the main reason for worse performance.
4.6 Deceiving actions and SIEVE robustness
Besides following the data dissemination and SIEVE pro-
tocols, malicious nodes may also implement disturbing
actions aiming at preventing or delaying their identifica-
tion. In the following a number of deceiving actions are
investigated.
• Reduced pollution intensity at the coded packet
level: a malicious node modifies a coded packet with
probability ppoll (the reference scenario is analyzed
with ppoll = 1). Figure 9 shows how SIEVE per-
forms when nodes lower their pollution intensity to
ppoll = 0.5, 0.25, 0.125 in the attempt of making their
identification harder. It can be noted that SIEVE is
able to spot malicious nodes in all cases although
very low pollution intensities delay identification.
Nevertheless, it is worth pointing out that tuning
the pollution intensity yields a natural trade-off
between speed of identification and average damage
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caused to honest nodes, i.e., the lower ppoll the lower
the number of polluted chunks and the longer the
time to identification.
• Reduced pollution intensity at the chunk level: a
malicious node pollutes a chunk with probability
cpoll and the corresponding coded packets are mod-
ified with probability ppoll. In Figure 10 we show
results for cpoll = 0.75, 0.5 and ppoll = 1, compar-
ing them to the reference scenario (analyzed with
cpoll = ppoll = 1 ). Also in this case, we observe that
malicious nodes are identified by SIEVE albeit at the
price of some delay for low values of cpoll.
• Check status falsification: with probability plie a
positive check obtained by a malicious node is for-
warded as negative and viceversa. Figure 11 shows
that this trick is ineffective: indeed, the only effect
is a limited increase in the values of tsi(x). Figure
12 also shows that SIEVE is able to achieve high
accuracy even in extreme cases when half of the
moving nodes is malicious. Indeed, provided that
the system operates for long enough time, SIEVE
is able to allow every node to identify all existing
malicious nodes.
• Honest nodes disparaging: malicious nodes always
produce dummy positive checks involving a set of
honest nodes. In this case malicious nodes flip a coin
and, with probability pdisparage, they replace the ac-
tual uploaders of a check with a set of honest nodes;
the detection flag is marked as positive. Figure 13
shows SIEVE performance when pdisparage = 1 and
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intensities.
honest nodes are either randomly chosen or chosen
in the same fixed order followed by all malicious
nodes (this is a colluding attack to honest nodes).
It can be noted that, by colluding, malicious nodes
only succeed in slightly delay their identification. As
a matter of fact, SIEVE is able to correctly identify all
malicious nodes anyway at the end of the simulation
experiments.
• Increasing the number of malicious nodes: the last
stress test for SIEVE is to consider its performance
for an increasing number of malicious nodes that co-
ordinate to launch the colluding attack. In Figure 14
we show results for up to P = 100 malicious nodes
in the system (in all cases, Pfast = Pslow = P2 ). It can
be noted that SIEVE reaches high accuracy at the
end of the simulation experiments with an increase
of the tsi(x) values, provided that the system runs
for a long enough time.
4.7 Coding efficiency vs. SIEVE performance
Coding efficiency is defined as the capability of decoding
with the smallest possible overhead ϵ. It is well known
that LT codes overhead decreases as K increases [15];
therefore high values of K are preferred in most cases.
We compared the SIEVE performance for different val-
ues of K and Scb to keep the chunk size constant; in
particular, Figure 15 shows results forK = 50, Scb = 1000
and K = 200, Scb = 250. It can be noted that small values
of K yield better accuracy and lower reaction times.
Table 4 summarizes the structural properties of Gn for
different values of K. It can be noted K = 50 yields both
lower average number of nodes per check and length
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K |C| zU |U| zC length 4 cycles
50 499.447 6.10647 230.457 12.9598 11508.5
100 492.807 8.5262 231.687 17.3395 32021.6
200 480.232 11.3097 229.752 22.1949 94461.8
TABLE 4: Structural properties of Gn for different values
of K.
four cycles.
As a side effect of using a smaller value for K, the
probability of receiving a coded packet from a malicious
node is lower as confirmed by the attack damage, i.e.,
the average fraction of corrupted decoded chunks, that
is equal to 0.20 for K = 50 and 0.33 for K = 200.
4.8 Bandwidth, memory and CPU costs
The bandwidth overhead required by a node to im-
plement SIEVE is determined by the number of bits
necessary to transmit a check when decoding a data
chunk plus the bits required by the broadcasting of Q
checks every Ts seconds. In our simulations a check I
is represented by using a message whose payload size
is equal to bI = 32|UI |+ 1 bits; in this expression 32|UI |
bits are required to store the node identifiers represented
as integers and one bit is used for the chunk corruption
flag.
From the simulations of the reference scenario, we
measured an average value of the bandwidth overhead
equal to 301 bps per node (95% confidence interval
[193, 408]). We also measured the average throughput,
defined as the number of decoded bits (of data chunks)
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Fig. 15: Accuracy (left), completeness (middle), and time to identification (right) of SIEVE for different values of K.
per second, that is equal to 20483 bps (95% confidence
interval [13162, 27803]). It follows that SIEVE communi-
cation overhead, defined as the ratio between bandwidth
overhead and throughput, is limited to about 1.5%. It is
worth noticing that one contribution to the bandwidth
overhead depends on Q and Ts and can therefore be
traded-off. As an example, the SIEVE communication
overhead for Q = 5 and Ts = 15s (see Fig. 4) turns out
to be about the 0.5%.
One of the main requirements a solution for MANET
must satisfy is to have a low computational and memory
cost. We measured the average CPU time experienced
to run SIEVE on a single factor graph in our C++
implementation on an Intel(R) Core i5 2.80GHz CPU:
we obtained 25ms. Of course, MANET nodes do not
have the same computational power of a desktop PC
but newer CPUs equipping tablets and smart phones are
reducing the gap, e.g., the ARM Cortex-A9 MPCore has
up to 4 cores, 2 GHz clock, and 10,000 DMIPS.
Furthermore, storage requirements are very low: the
average number of checks in Gn for fast, slow, and still
nodes is 435, 423, and 742, respectively. The average
number of nodes in Gn is equal to 227, 224, and 228,
respectively. The factor graph must be represented as a
dynamic undirected bipartite graph. Several data struc-
tures can be used. In our implementation for each check
I (received during the last w seconds) we store the set
of uploaders i ∈ UI , each one representing an arc of
the factor graph (represented as the pair of identifiers
(I, i)). Each node/check identifier is represented as a
32 bit integer; therefore, the number of bits for storing
the factor graph is equal to 2 · 32 · |E| bits. In our
experiments, the average number of arcs of the factor
graph is equal to 3823, 3962, and 5790 (for fast, slow
and still nodes respectively). It follows that the average
memory requirements is equal to 30.5 kB, 31.7 kB, and
46.3 kB, respectively.
5 RELATED WORK
MANET are vulnerable to attacks at any layer of the
Internet model [1], [2]. In the area of network coding
several efforts have been devoted to devise on-the-fly
verification techniques carried out by participants [20],
[21], [22], [23], [24], [25], [26] to identify the sources of
corrupted data. The major drawback of these elegant
methods is the high computational costs for verification
and the communication overhead due to pre-distribution
of verification information. In [9], [10], [11] previous
works have been extended to limit the communication
overhead and achieve high level of robustness to pollu-
tion in the context of network coding applied to static
wireless mesh networks.
Error correction (and algebraic) approaches have been
devised to deal with data corruption attacks in network
coding [27], [28], [29]; these methods introduce coding
redundancy to allow receivers to correct errors but their
effectiveness depends on the amount of corrupted infor-
mation. Recently, [12] has proposed an extension of pre-
vious work which aims at limiting the communication
overhead required for verification of coded packets.
The data corruption attack we consider in this paper is
a well-known plague in peer-to-peer streaming systems.
Unfortunately, all solutions developed in that research
are not easily adoptable in MANET. The work by Wang
et al. [13] proposes a detection scheme where each peer is
able to detect receipt of corrupted blocks by checking the
adherence of the decoded chunk to the specific formats
of the video stream. Peers detecting polluted chunks
send alert messages to the video server and the tracker.
Upon receipt of an alert the server computes a checksum
of the original chunk and disseminates it to all peers in
the overlay. The checksum is used by peers to identify
which uploader actually sent a corrupted block. Peers
report their suspects to the server and a true polluters
cannot lie (the authors develop a non repudiation pro-
tocol to ensure that peers cannot lie when reporting
suspects to the servers). Sequence numbers are used to
tag alerts to deal with cycles in the overlay. This solution
requires a centralized monitoring and management point
that is not available in MANET. Therefore, it is hard (if
not impossible) to adapt in the context we consider in
our work.
The work by Li and Lui [30] presents a distributed
detection algorithm and analyzes its performance. The
technique is based on simple intersection operations per-
formed by peers: each peer starts with a set of suspects
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that is equal to the entire neighborhood that is shrunk as
long as chunks are downloaded from a random subset
of uploaders independently chosen from the entire set
of neighbors. The scheme allows malicious nodes to
send corrupted blocks using a pollution probability. The
technique is analyzed when the number of malicious
nodes in the neighborhood is known in advance and
an approximation is proposed when this quantity is
unknown. The same approach has been also adopted
in network coding wireless mesh networks [31], [32],
where the analysis is restricted on the backbone network
consisting of stationary (with minimal mobility) mesh
routers. The technique is attractive thanks to its simplic-
ity and fully distributed nature although performance
deteriorates when multiple polluter exist. Nonetheless,
the technique works when then neighborhood of a node
does not vary with time. Also in this case a comparison
with our work is quite difficult.
The work by Jin et al [33] proposed a monitoring
architecture to build and maintain a reputation system
that peers use to select neighbors. The focus of the paper
is on reputation computation, storage and load balancing
among monitoring nodes. The results show that the
system is able to detect malicious nodes up to a certain
degree of lies. Nevertheless, the technique relies on the
assumption that each peer is able to compute the amount
of corrupted blocks received by each uploader during
a monitoring period. Unfortunately, this capability is
not available in the system we consider in our work:
the original chunk can only be obtained if there are
no malicious nodes among the chunk providers and if
corruption is detected the honest node only knows that
at least one of the chunk providers is malicious. In this
case, comparison with our work is simply not possible.
6 CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we have proposed the novel SIEVE tech-
nique for the identification of malicious nodes perform-
ing a pollution attack within a MANET. A data dis-
semination application based on the distribution of LT
coded data packets has been considered as a use case,
where malicious nodes aim at preventing the delivery of
the information corrupting, i.e., polluting, coded pack-
ets. In turn, the reception of a single corrupted packet
may break down the decoding of a whole data chunk.
Fortunately, the LT decoding procedure can be used by
each node to detect that a data chuck has been attacked;
nonetheless, since parallel downloading form multiple
nodes is used, such detection does not allow to iden-
tify the malicious nodes. This latter represents the core
problem solved by SIEVE. In SIEVE node collaborations
are represented by a bipartite graph linking nodes and
detection opportunities, the checks. It is worth pointing
out that such representation is quite general and can be
used in many other collaborative scenarios other than
the data dissemination use case analyzed in this paper.
SIEVE is a completely distributed technique that, us-
ing statistical inference based on the belief propagation
algorithm, allows each node to independently analyze
local snapshots of the bipartite graph of the collected
checks to estimate the probability of nodes being ma-
licious and to perform a progressive ranking of the
suspect nodes. Our results, worked out using detailed
ns-3 simulations, show that SIEVE is accurate in letting
each honest node identify all malicious nodes under
several scenarios. We have analyzed the sensitivity of
SIEVE performance to the nodes mobility; we have
discovered that SIEVE is very robust to several deceiving
actions, colluding attacks launched by malicious nodes,
and amount of malicious nodes inside the network.
Future works will be focused in two main directions.
From the one hand we will complete the design and
experimentation of a full system to counteract an active
attack within MANET, including both malicious node
identification and their subsequent isolation or removal.
The techniques adopted for the identification and the
following removal of malicious nodes clearly require
a joint and careful design to optimize the overall per-
formance. The other research line will be devoted to
better understand the features of the bipartite graph
representation, e.g. presence of loops, average node and
check degrees, that affect SIEVE accuracy. Such study
is expected to let us further improve its performance
by adding the checks in a smart and adaptive way
guaranteeing better convergence of the BP algorithm.
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